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EIGHTH AMENDMENT-PRETRIAL
DETENTION: WHAT WILL BECOME
OF THE INNOCENT?
United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Bail Reform Act of 1984' provides, inter alia, that certain
defendants may be detained without bail pending trial when ajudi-
cial officer has held an adversarial hearing and determined, on the
basis of clear and convincing evidence, that "no condition or combi-
nation of conditions [of bail] will reasonably assure... the safety of
any other person and the community .... -2 In United States v. Sa-
lerno,3 the United States Supreme Court held that pretrial detention
without bail on the grounds of dangerousness violates neither the
fifth 4 nor eighth amendment 5 to the United States Constitution.
This Note summarizes the opinions of the Court in Salerno and criti-
cizes the majority's analysis and conclusions. This Note then dis-
cusses whether and at what point extended pretrial detention
becomes punitive and therefore unconstitutional. This Note con-
cludes that only by strictly limiting the length of detention can the
Bail Reform Act be administered efficiently and fairly.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND OPINIONS BELOW
Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro were arrested on March
21, 1986, after being named defendants in a twenty-nine-count in-
dictment which alleged their leadership participation in the Geno-
vese Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra.6 At their
arraignment, the government moved for the pretrial detention of
Salerno and Cafaro without bail pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 3041-43, 3062, 3141-50, 3154, 3156, 3731, 3772, 4282 (1985).
2 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1985).
3 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
4 The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part: "No
person shall . . .be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
.... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5 The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part: "Ex-
cessive bail shall not be required ...." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.




At the hearing on the government's motion for pretrial deten-
tion before the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, the government proffered evidence that Salerno and
Cafaro were leaders of the Genovese family and that they had en-
gaged in and conspired to engage in various criminal activities. 8
The allegations of criminal activity included mail and wire fraud, ex-
tortion, and gambling offenses, as well as numerous racketeering ac-
tivities, including conspiracy to commit murder.9 The government's
evidence consisted mainly of tape recordings gathered through
court-ordered electronic surveillance of the defendants and their as-
sociates.10 The recordings detailed the defendants' positions in the
Genovese family, as well as their participation in various violent
criminal conspiracies." In addition, the government proffered the
testimony of witnesses who would testify to Salerno's role in two
murder conspiracies. 12 In resistance to the motion, Salerno offered
character witnesses and a letter from his physician attesting to his
poor health; Cafaro offered no evidence but argued that the wiretap
conversations were no more than "tough talk."' 13 Finding that no
condition or combination of conditions would reasonably assure the
safety of the community, the district judge ordered the defendants
detained without bail pending trial.14
Salerno and Cafaro appealed the order of detention to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing both
statutory15 and constitutional grounds for reversal.1 6 The court








14 Id. The opinion of the district court in United States v. Salerno is reported at 631 F.
Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
15 United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 69-71 (2d Cir. 1986). The defendants ar-
gued, first, that the electronic surveillance evidence was wrongly admitted into evidence
by the trial court in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1985)(requiring party against
whom intercepted communications will be offered to be provided a copy of the docu-
mentation which authorized the interception not less than ten days before the proceed-
ing); and second, that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of
dangerousness under 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1985)(requiring government to prove facts in
support of allegation of dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence).




jurisdictional challenge by the government.1 7 Then, the court ad-
dressed the defendants' argument that insofar as it authorized incar-
ceration based on dangerousness, pretrial detention under the Bail
Reform Act was an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty without
due process of law.18 The government argued that although pretrial
detention on the grounds of dangerousness could not be upheld as
a punishment, it was constitutional as a regulatory measure to fur-
ther the compelling government interest in public safety.1 9 Over a
dissent,20 the second circuit held that even if limited pretrial deten-
tion was a regulatory measure imposed solely to protect the public
from dangerous persons, such detention violated the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.21
In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals reasoned that
the mere "lodging of [criminal] charges" against a person could not
constitutionally enable the government to deprive that person of
liberty. 22 The court observed that neither unindicted citizens nor
convicted criminals who had served their sentences could be impris-
oned in anticipation of future crimes. 23 In all three instances, the
court concluded, preventive detention would violate" 'the constitu-
tional imperative that incarceration to protect society from criminals
may be accomplished only as punishment of those convicted for past
crimes and not as regulation of those feared likely to commit future
crimes.' -24 The court distinguished Schall v. Martin,25 in which the
United States Supreme Court upheld the brief detention ofjuvenile
offenders as a regulatory measure, on the grounds that juveniles
have a lesser interest in liberty than adults. 26 The court asserted
that unlike the liberty of competent adults, the liberty of juveniles
17 Salerno, 794 F.2d at 68-69. The government argued that the defendants' notices of
appeal were not timely filed.
18 Id. at 71.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 75. (Feinberg, CJ., dissenting). Chief Judge Feinberg would have upheld
the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act's pretrial detention provisions where the
detention was limited to periods too short to be considered punitive.
21 Id. at 71. The majority of the court held the detention unconstitutional without
regard to its duration. Cf. id. at 75. (Feinberg, CJ., dissenting) (pretrial detention un-
constitutional only when unduly prolonged). All members of the court agreed that pre-
trial detention without bail is constitutional if the accused threatens to flee the
jurisdiction or threatens to tamper with or intimidate witnesses orjurors. Id. at 71; id. at
76 (Feinberg, CJ., dissenting).
22 Id. at 72-73.
23 Id. at 73.
24 Id. at 72 (quoting United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1001 (2d Cir.
1986)).
25 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
26 Salerno, 794 F.2d at 74.
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may sometimes be "subordinated to the State's " 'parens patriae in-
terest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child.' "27
Finding pretrial detention on the grounds of dangerousness uncon-
stitutional, the court of appeals remanded the matter to the district
court for the setting of conditions of bail.2 8
III. THE OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit and upheld the facial constitutionality
of the pretrial detention provisions of the Bail Reform Act. 29 Chief
Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion, in which Justices
White, Blackmun, Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia joined.30 Noting
that a successful facial constitutional challenge to a legislative act
requires that the challenger prove the act unconstitutional in every
circumstance, the Chief Justice addressed the respondents' fifth and
eighth amendment challenges to the Bail Reform Act in turn.3 1
Examining the Act in light of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment,3 2 the Court first considered the respondents' argument
that pretrial detention constituted an impermissible punishment
before trial.33 Citing Bell v. Wofish3 4 for the proposition that not all
detention is punishment, the Court applied a three-part test to de-
termine whether the restriction on liberty authorized by the Act was
punitive or regulatory. First, the Court looked to the legislative in-
tent of the Act.3 5 The Court determined that if Congress had in-
tended to punish pretrial detainees, the Act would be uncon-
stitutional.3 6 Next, if no punitive intent was expressed by Congress,
the Court would determine " 'whether an alternative purpose to
which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for
it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
27 Id. (quoting Schal v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984)(quoting Santowsky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982))).
28 Id.
29 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2098.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 2100-01.
32 "No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
33 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101.
34 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979)(holding that imposition of conditions necessary to main-
tain security of detention facility was not punishment as to persons detained pretrial on
grounds of risk of flight).




purpose assigned [to it].' "37 If the restriction related to a permissi-
ble alternative purpose and was not excessive, and no punitive in-
tent was shown, then the restriction authorized by the Act would be
deemed regulatory. 38
Applying this test, the Court concluded that no punitive con-
gressional intent was shown and that pretrial detention constituted a
permissible regulation which was not excessive in relation to the
goal sought to be achieved. 39 In support of its conclusion, the
Court cited the legislative history of the Bail Reform Act to deter-
mine congressional intent,40 and compared the goals and proce-
dures of the Act to those found permissible in Schall v. Martin4' to
determine whether the Act was a rational and not excessive means
of achieving a permissible regulatory goal.42 The Court affirmed its
earlier opinion that protecting the community from dangerous per-
sons is a legitimate regulatory goal and observed that the goals and
procedures of the Act were comparable to those approved in
Schall.43 The Court found, therefore, that the pretrial detention
provisions of the Bail Reform Act are regulatory in nature.44
Having established the regulatory nature of the Act, the Court
continued its analysis by demonstrating that the government's inter-
est in detaining certain individuals can sometimes outweigh the lib-
erty interest of those individuals. 45 The Court pointed out that
consistent with the Constitution, dangerous individuals have been
detained in times of war 46 or insurrection; 47 pending deportation
proceedings; 48 where the person is mentally unstable49 or incompe-
tent to stand trial;50 where the person is ajuvenile;5' pending deter-
mination of probable cause to arrest; 52 and where an arrestee
37 Id. (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984)(quoting Kennedy v. Men-
doza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963))).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. (citing S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1983)("[P]retrial detention is
not intended to promote the traditional aims of punishment such as retribution or deter-
rence ....").
41 467 U.S. 253 (1984)(upholding brief detention ofjuveniles).
42 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101-02.
43 Id. at 2101.
44 Id. at 2102.
45 Id.
46 Id. (citing Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948)).
47 Id. (citing Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909)).
48 Id. (citing Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952)).
49 Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)).
50 Id. (citingJackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)).
51 Id. (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)).
52 Id. (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)).
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threatens to flee the jurisdiction or jeopardize the trial process by
threatening witnesses. 53 The Court stated that it would evaluate the
pretrial detention provisions of the Bail Reform Act in "precisely
the same manner that [it had] evaluated the laws in the cases dis-
cussed above."'54 Thus, the Court determined to weigh the govern-
mental interest sought to be advanced, in light of the procedures
used, against the liberty interests of the individuals detained.55
Describing the government's interest in crime prevention as
"legitimate and compelling, ' 56 the Court reasoned that the interest
in preventing crimes by adult arrestees could-be no less compelling
than the interest in juvenile crime prevention approved in SchalU.57
Because the Bail Reform Act detained only persons accused of spec-
ified serious crimes and only after an adversarial hearing, allowing
this detention would be less radical than allowing the detention in
Schall.58 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted Congress' finding that the
persons who would be affected by pretrial detention are extraordi-
nary risks to the community after arrest.59 The Court concluded
that the state's interest in minimizing the risk of pretrial crime, tem-
pered by the procedural safeguards afforded by the Act, outweighs
the liberty interest of those individuals who would be detained
under the Act.60 The Court held that the Act, therefore, did not
violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 6'
Next, the Court considered the respondents' argument that
pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act violates the excessive
bail clause of the eighth amendment. 62 The respondents relied on
Stack v. Boyle, 63 in which the Court held that twelve persons accused
53 Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 2102-03.
56 Id. at 2102 (citing De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960)).
57 Id. at 2103 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)).
58 Id. The Salerno Court explained that the statute upheld in Schall allowed detention
of any juvenile arrested on any charge after a showing of possible dangerousness,
whereas the Bail Reform Act focused on a more specific group of individuals who are
accused of a specific group of offenses.
59 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2103 (citing S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7
(1983)(noting study indicating that approximately one out of every six defendants is
rearrested during pretrial period. Lazar Institute, Pretrial Release: An Evaluation of Defend-
ant Outcomes and Program Impact 48 (Washington, D.C., August 1981))).
60 Id.
61 Id. The Court held that the Act, on its face, comported with both substantive and
procedural due process.
62 Id. at 2104. The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
part: "Excessive bail shall not be required...." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
63 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
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of ,iolating the Smith Act 64 were entitled to a bail hearing at which
reasonable bail must be set. The respondents argued that under
Stack, the eighth amendment guaranteed them the right to bail set at
an amount no higher than calculated to ensure their presence at
trial. 65 Because pretrial detention without bail was, effectively, infi-
nite bail set without regard to the risk of flight, the respondents con-
tended that pretrial detention must be excessive bail which is
prohibited by the eighth amendment. 66 This argument was
grounded on the proposition that the sole purpose of bail is to
maintain the viability of the trial process. 67 Consistent with this pur-
pose, the respondents argued that bail could be refused only if the
defendant threatens to flee the jurisdiction or otherwise impede the
trial process by threatening witnesses or jurors.68
Characterizing the dicta in Stack as "far too slender a reed on
which to rest this argument," 69 the majority agreed that the primary
purpose of bail is to protect the trial process by ensuring the de-
fendant's appearance at a fair trial.70 The Court, however, rejected
"the proposition that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits
the government from pursuing other admittedly compelling inter-
ests through regulation of pretrial release."'71 The Court found,
first, that the excessive bail clause in itself does not guarantee that
any bail shall be available; 72 second, that the right to bail clearly is
not absolute; 73 and third, that the Stack court was faced with a differ-
64 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1985). The Smith Act of 1940 makes it a criminal offense to
advocate the overthrow of the government of the United States.
65 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2104. In its discussion, the Stack Court wrote:
From the passage of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789... federal law has unequivo-
cally provided that a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admitted to
bail. This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered
preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to
conviction. Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of
innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.... Bail
set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to [assure the defend-
ant's presence at trial] ... is "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment.
Stack, 342 U.S. at 4-5 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
66 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2104.
67 Id. See, e.g., Tribe, An Ounce Of Detention: Preventive Justice In The World OfJohn Mitch-
ell, 56 U. VA. L. REv. 371, 376-78 (1970)(arguing that because common law prescribed
death as punishment for even non-violent criminals, accused persons had great incentive
to flee; traditional denial of bail in capital cases, therefore, must be understood as a
means of preventing the defendant's flight and not as a means of preventing other
crimes).
68 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2104.
69 Id. See supra note 65 (quoting Stack dicta).






ent question than that presented in this case. 74 The Court cited
Carlson v. Landon75 as more on point.76 In Carlson, the Court held
that resident aliens who were thought to be communists could be
detained without bail pending a determination of deportability.77
Assuming without deciding that Congress is limited in its power to
define bailable offenses, the Salerno Court held that the Bail Reform
Act is constitutional because pretrial detention is not excessive in
relation to the government interest in protecting the community. 78
The Bail Reform Act, therefore, does not on its face violate the ex-
cessive bail clause of the eighth amendment or the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.
B. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S DISSENT
Justice Marshall wrote a four-part dissenting opinion in which
Justice Brennan joined.79 The dissent struck out at the majority
opinion as "consistent with the usages of tyranny and the excesses
of what bitter experience teaches us to call the police state."8 0
In Part I, the dissent argued that this case should be dismissed
for lack of a" 'live case or controversy' " as required by Article III of
the Constitution.8' Salerno had been sentenced to 100 years im-
prisonment on charges unrelated to the charges in this prosecution
prior to the oral argument of this case before the Court.8 2 The dis-
sent concluded that Salerno's case was moot, therefore, and outside
the jurisdiction of the Court.8 3 Similarly, Cafaro had been released
74 Id. (construing Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951)). The Salerno Court characterized
the question in Stack as being whether bail set at an amount greater than necessary to
ensure the defendants' presence at trial was permissible where the statute under which
the defendants were arrested specifically allowed bail.
75 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
76 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2104.
77 Carlson, 342 U.S. at 544. The defendants in Carlson were accused of advocating the
overthrow of the government in violation of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 18 U.S.C.
§ 793 (1985), by virtue of their membership in the Communist Party of the United
States.
78 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2105. The Court said that the only arguable substantive limi-
tation on Congress's power to regulate bail is that the scheme not be excessive in rela-
tion to its goal. Id.
79 Id. at 2105 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 2106 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 2107 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(quoting Burke v. Barnes, 107 S. Ct. 734, 736
(1987)). Article III of the United States Constitution provides, in part: "The judicial
power shall extend... to Controversies to which the United States shall be a party ......
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
82 Salerno was sentenced to 100 years imprisonment on January 13, 1987. Salerno,
107 S. Ct. at 2106 (Marshall,J., dissenting). This case was arguedJanuary 21, 1987. Id.
at 2095.
83 Id. at 2106 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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on a $1,000,000 personal recognizance bond in exchange for his
assistance as a cooperating witness even before the petition for cer-
tiorari was granted in this case.8 4 Notwithstanding a contrary order
of the district court entered in what the dissent characterized as a
"vain attempt" to keep the controversy alive,85 the dissent con-
cluded that the government did not need a pretrial detention order
to incarcerate Salerno and had already voluntarily released Cafaro
on a bond.86 Thus, the dissent concluded that both cases should
have been dismissed for want of a "live case or controversy. ' 87
In Part II of his dissent, Justice Marshall criticized the majority's
division of the respondents' "unitary argument" involving the fifth
and eighth amendments into two distinct halves. 88 In Justice Mar-
shall's opinion, the division of the argument into separate analyses
of the fifth and eighth amendment issues enabled the majority to
attack the parts of the respondents' argument without facing the
whole.89 In so doing, the majority avoided the pith of the issue-
whether the fifth and eighth amendments together prescribe any
substantive limit on the power of Congress to regulate pretrial
release.90
Justice Marshall continued his criticism of the majority's "false
dichotomy" by pointing out the logical inadequacy of the Court's
due process argument. 91 The dissent argued that a finding that pre-
trial detention is a reasonable means of protecting the community
from dangerous persons does not support the conclusion that pre-
trial detention is regulatory, as opposed to punitive, or constitu-
tional, even if regulatory. 92 To illustrate the untenability of the
majority's position, Justice Marshall extended the majority's logic to
a hypothetical case. 93 In the hypothetical, Congress finds that much
violent crime is committed by unemployed persons, and that much
violent crime is committed at night.94 In response, Congress de-
clares that after a judicial proceeding, anyone who is found to be
84 Id. at 2106-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Cafaro was released October 9, 1986. Id.
at 2106 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Solicitor General's petition for certiorari was not
granted until November 3, 1986. United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 397 (1986).
85 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2106 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 2107 (Marshall,J, dissenting).
87 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 2109 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 2107 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 2108 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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unemployed may be subjected to a dusk-to-dawn curfew.95 Because
the curfew is not intended as punishment and is a rational response
to the legitimate regulatory goal of fighting crime, Justice Marshall
concluded that the majority's due process analysis would validate
the curfew. 96 The dissent characterized such a conclusion as "ab-
surd," and warned that under the majority's analysis the govern-
ment could reclothe any punitive scheme in regulatory justifications
and thereby make it constitutional.97 Protesting that the due pro-
cess clause protects substantive rights other than the right to be free
from punishment, 98 the dissent dismissed the majority's due process
argument as "an exercise in obfuscation." 99
Turning to the eighth amendment issues, the dissent rejected
the "sophistry" embedded in the majority's conclusion that al-
though the eighth amendment prohibits the setting of excessive
bail, it does not prohibit the setting of no bail whatsoever. 100 In
either case, the effect is the same-continued incarceration for the
defendant. 1° 1 The dissent criticized the majority's implicit sugges-
tion that the excessive bail clause applies to the judiciary but not to
the legislature, and argued that the eighth amendment applies
equally to Congress and to the courts. 10 2 Justice Marshall reasoned
that because a judge cannot legally circumvent the Constitution's
prohibition of excessive bail simply by refusing bail, neither can
Congress.1 03
In Part III of his dissent, Justice Marshall set forth his view of
the proper, limited place for pretrial detention in our constitutional
system. First, the dissent noted the many cases that have recognized
the presumption of innocence as an "axiomatic and elementary"
principle inherent in the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. 10 4 In the dissent's view, the presumption of innocence is a
substantive limit on the legislature's power to regulate pretrial re-
lease. 10 5 Justice Marshall pointed out the irony that the language of
95 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 2100-10 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Injustice Marshall's view, the due process
clause also protects the individual's substantive right to be presumed innocent of crime
until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
99 Id. at 2108 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
100 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101 Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 2109 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting)(quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453
(1895)).
105 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the Bail Reform Act affirms the presumption of innocence while the
majority opinion abolishes it in practice.10 6 To demonstrate how
the majority's approval of the Act abolishes the presumption of in-
nocence, Justice Marshall hypothesized a defendant who, despite a
pretrial finding of dangerousness, had been acquitted at trial.'0 7
The government, of course, could not detain such a person after the
trial on the grounds of dangerousness, because that would entail
imprisonment for crimes not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 0 8
Reasoning that the presumption of innocence means that "the de-
fendant is as innocent on the day before his trial as he is on the
morning after his acquittal,"' 0 9 Justice Marshall concluded that pre-
trial preventive detention cannot be constitutional unless the consti-
tutionally-rooted presumption of innocence is disregarded. "Under
this statute," Justice Marshall wrote,
[a]n untried indictment somehow acts to permit a detention, based on
other charges, which after an acquittal would be unconstitutional. The
conclusion is inescapable that the indictment has been turned into evi-
dence, if not that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, then
that left to his own devices he will soon be guilty of something else.
"'If it suffices to accuse, what will become of the innocent?' ",10
Turning again to the eighth amendment excessive bail clause,
the dissent acknowledged that pretrial detention without bail is con-
stitutional in the traditional cases."' The dissent, therefore, ap-
proved of pretrial detention without bail to ensure the defendant's
initial appearance before a magistrate or to prevent the defendant
from undermining the trial process by fleeing the jurisdiction or by
threatening witnesses or jurors. 112 In justice Marshall's view, how-
ever, these exceptional deprivations of liberty are acceptable only as
means necessary to protect the trial process. 113 Because pretrial de-
tention authorized by the Bail Reform Act has no relation to the
i
106 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Subsection 3142(j) of the Bail Reform Act provides
that "[nlothing in this section shall be construed as modifying or limiting the presump-
tion of innocence." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(6) (1985).
107 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2110 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
109 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
110 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting)(quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 455
(1895) (quoting Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gesterum Libri Qui Supersunt, L. XVIII,
c. 1, A.D. 359))).
111 Id. (Marshall,J, dissenting). See also supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text (list-
ing circumstances under which denial of bail is traditionally approved).
112 107 S. Ct. at 2110-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 2111 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also noted that the majority
offered no authority "for the proposition that bail has traditionally been denied prospec-




governments's interest in protecting that process, Justice Marshall
concluded that the interests served by such detention cannot prop-
erly be considered in the Court's excessive bail clause analysis.1 14
Finally, Part IV of the dissent criticized the government's self-
serving abuse of the Bail Reform Act embodied in the release of
Cafaro as a cooperating witness. Cafaro had been detained at the
government's request and had been characterized, before he agreed
to cooperate, as too dangerous to be released.1 15 Justice Marshall
submitted that this "peculiar" turn of events served as an "eloquent
demonstration of the coercive power of authority to imprison upon
prediction, [and] of the dangers which the almost inevitable abuses
pose to the cherished liberties of a free society." 116 Admitting that
the preservation of liberty is often a difficult 1 7 and costly task,118
Justice Marshall concluded by noting that the Constitution can shel-
ter society from unchecked government power only if society has
"the courage, and the self-restraint, to protect [itself]" by steadfastly
maintaining the liberties of even those persons who are believed to
be guilty.119
C. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
In a three-paragraph dissent, Justice Stevens agreed with Jus-
tice Marshall that pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act is
unconstitutional.' 20 In addition to agreeing that the case should be
dismissed for want of a live case or controversy, 121 Justice Stevens
also agreed that pretrial detention on the basis of future dangerous-
ness is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence protected by
the fifth amendment and is violative of the excessive bail clause of
the eighth amendment. 122 Justice Stevens, however, reserved judg-
ment on the broader question of whether preventive detention for
114 Id. at 2111 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
115 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
116 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117 Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that the protection of liberty is
made more difficult because" 'the safeguards of liberty [must] frequently [be] forged in
controversies involving not very nice people.'" (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Rabinowitz was subsequently over-
ruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
118 107 S. Ct. at 2112 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's reference to the
social costs of pretrial liberty for defendants like Salerno and Cafaro apparently refers to
the risk that such defendants may, in fact, commit crimes that would have been pre-
vented by pretrial detention.
119 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 2112 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 2113 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 2112 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1988] 1059
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
reasons other than those approved by Justice Marshall can ever be
constitutional. 123
IV. DISCUSSION
In United States v. Salerno,' 24 the Supreme Court affirmed the
constitutionality of a statute which violates the fifth amendment by
imposing punishment without an adjudication of guilt. In approv-
ing the Bail Reform Act, the Court abandoned common sense,
strained precedent, and ignored the great weight of sociological
data that dooms the fair and effective use of pretrial detention.
Likewise, the Court's eighth amendment analysis insufficiently
weighed the traditional role of bail in American criminal law and
contradicted the common sense import of the excessive bail clause.
Essentially, the decision unjustly sacrificed the individual's right to
be presumed innocent to the government's interest in pretrial
detention.
A. THE PUNITIVE EFFECT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION
In concluding that pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act
is not punitive, the Court defied the common sense understanding
of what it means to be punished. Common sense counsels that im-
prisonment for an extended period of time is punishment.' 25
Although "regulatory"' 126 is an innocuous label for depriving pre-
sumptively innocent citizens of their liberty, an innocuous label is
no consolation for the person swept into the nation's penal system
without the benefit of a trial.127
It is well established that punishment without adjudication of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt violates the due process clause of
123 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124 107 S. Ct. 2095.
125 United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1368 (D.C. 1981)(Mack, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
126 The Salerno Court held that imprisonment imposed for the regulatory purpose of
protecting the community does not violate the fifth amendment. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at
2101-02.
127 Although the Act provides that the defendant should be detained separately from
convicted criminals where possible, it is doubtful whether that goal can be achieved.
Note, The Loss of Innocence: Preventive Detention Under The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 22 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 805, 818 (1985)(nonexistence of separate facilities or overcrowding of
facilities is likely to frustrate separation of prisoners and detainees)[hereinafter Note,
The Loss of Innocence]; Note, Preventive Detention and United States v. Edwards: Burdening the
Innocent, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 191, 205 n.101 (1982)(virtually impossible to achieve separa-
tion of detainees from convicts)[hereinafter Note, Burdening the Innocent].
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the fifth amendment. 128 Although the government may temporarily
detain a person without an adjudication of guilt for a legitimate reg-
ulatory purpose, 129 neither legislative intent nor description of the
detention as regulatory will validate the detention if its effect or sim-
ilarity to traditional punishment make the sanction punitive.'3 0 A
fair reading of precedent confirms that the pretrial detention au-
thorized by the Bail Reform Act is punitive and therefore
unconstitutional.
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,' 31 the Supreme Court an-
nounced a comprehensive test for distinguishing regulatory from
punitive sanctions. In that case, the Court struck down a statutory
scheme which automatically divested an American of citizenship for
remaining outside the United States in order to avoid wartime mili-
tary service.13 2 The Court held that depriving a person of citizen-
ship is punishment.'3 3 Because this punishment was imposed
without trial, the statutory scheme was unconstitutional. 134 The
Mendoza-Martinez Court reviewed the cases in which the Court had
distinguished punitive from regulatory sanctions and summarized
them in a multi-factor test.135 The Court announced that if Con-
gress did not express a punitive intent in prescribing the sanction,
then the distinction turns on:
[W]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deter-
rence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned .... 136
According to this test, if no punitive congressional intent is mani-
128 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1979); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
671 n.40 (1977); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
129 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975)(upholding detention for limited time
necessary for administrative steps incident to arrest); United States v. Melendez-Carrion,
790 F.2d 984, 1002 (2d Cir. 1986)(holding that "[p]retrial detention to avoid undue risk
of flight orjeopardy to the trial process is not prohibited by a constitutional scheme that
relies on the trial process to determine guilt and enforce the criminal law.").
130 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1958);
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
131 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
132 Id. at 167.
133 Id. at 165.
134 Id. at 167.
135 Id. at 168-69.
136 Id. (citations omitted)(emphasis in original).
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fest, each factor in the test is to be weighed. 137 The test shows that
the Mendoza-Martinez Court prescribed an objective review of the op-
eration of a sanction and its effect on the defendant.138 This analy-
sis goes beyond a mere search for a rational connection between the
sanction and its end. The perspective of the defendant must be con-
sidered as well. If a "regulatory" sanction is so similar to punish-
ment as to appear indistinguishable in its effect to the objective
observer, the sanction should be considered punitive regardless of
its regulatory purpose.139
Accepting arguendo that Congress did not intend for pretrial de-
tention under the Bail Reform Act to be punitive, 140 the sanction
fails the Mendoza-Martinez test on almost every point.' 4 1 First, the
total deprivation of liberty authorized by the Act is obviously an af-
firmative disability or restraint. Second, imprisonment has histori-
cally been regarded as an "'infamous punishment.' "142 Third,
because pretrial detention is based on a finding of future danger-
ousness or an expectation of violent criminal activity,' 43 the sanc-
tion "comes into play" only upon a finding of scienter. Fourth, the
operation of the statute promotes the traditional aims of punish-
ment: retribution, by putting the defendant in a position where his
rights are forfeited only because of ajudgment triggered by his past
conduct; 144 deterrence, by incapacitating the defendant himself and
137 Id. at 169. Although convinced that deprivation of citizenship was punitive under
the test announced, the Court did not apply the full test because punitive congressional
intent made the full analysis unnecessary. Id.
138 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 564-67 (1979)(Marshall,J., dissenting); Note, The
Loss of Innocence, supra note 127, at 816-19; Note, Burdening the Innocent, supra note 127, at
203-05.
139 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1958) (determination of whether law is pe-
nal cannot depend on congressional label or intent, but requires disinterested consider-
ation of substance); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 564-65 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (determination of whether law is penal requires consideration of impact of
sanction on detainee).
140 See supra note 40 (quoting legislative history of the Bail Reform Act).
141 Note, The Loss of Innocence, supra note 127, at 816-19; Note, Burdening The Innocent,
supra note 127, at 202-07. See also supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text (analyzing
Mendoza-Martinez test).
142 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 569 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)).
143 "If... the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions [of
bail] will reasonably assure ... the safety of any other person and the community, he
shall order the detention of the person prior to trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1985); cf.
Note, Burdening the Innocent, supra note 127, at 204-05 (noting that crimes delineated in
District of Columbia pretrial detention statute include element of scienter).
144 Amicus Curiae Brief of The American Civil Liberties Union, New York Civil Liber-
ties Union, and the ACLU Foundation of Southern California in Support of Respon-
dents at 12-13, United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987)(No. 86-87).
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by creating a threat of similar detention for other offenders. 145 In-
deed, the threat of extended imprisonment before trial is surely a
more effective deterrent than other punitive sanctions like fines and
probation. Fifth, the feared future endangerment of the community
and the past act which triggered the sanction are already crimes.
Finally, even assuming that pretrial detention is rationally con-
nected to the prevention of crime, the means used to achieve that
goal are excessive in light of the persuasive evidence that judges are
likely to be poor predictors of criminal activity. 146 Under the Men-
doza-Martinez criteria, therefore, the effect of pretrial detention is
punitive.
In Salerno, the Court did not apply the comprehensive analysis
required by Mendoza-Martinez. Instead, the Court relied on an ab-
breviated restatement of the test found in Bell v. Wolfish. 147 In Wolf-
ish, the Court examined the conditions under which pretrial
detainees were held at a federal facility in New York. 148 Because the
plaintiffs were being held without bail under the traditional excep-
tion for those who threaten to flee the court's jurisdiction, the Wolf-
ish Court was not faced with the question presented in Salerno.14 9
The Wolfish Court held that reasonable prison restrictions necessary
to maintain order and security at the facility were not punitive. 150 In
the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist quoted the full text of the
Mendoza-Martinez test but then restated the test as being simply
"whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may ra-
tionally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears ex-
cessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it] ... -" 151
Justice Rehnquist supported his drastic restatement of the test with
neither precedent nor logic. In fact, he did not even acknowledge
the change.
The switch from the comprehensive, objective analysis of Men-
doza-Martinez to the diluted rational relation test espoused in Wolfish
145 Id.
146 United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1369-70 (D.C. 1981)(Mack,J., dissent-
ing) (listing authorities questioning ability to predict dangerous criminal behavior in dis-
cussion of District of Columbia detention statute), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982); See
also infra notes 167-173 and accompanying text (discussing impossibility of accurate pre-
dictions of dangerousness).
147 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
148 Id. at 523.
149 Id. at 534 n.15 ("The only justification for pretrial detention asserted by the Gov-
ernment is to ensure the detainee's presence at trial.... We, therefore, have no occa-
sion to consider whether any other governmental objectives may constitutionally justify
pretrial detention.").
150 Id. at 540.
151 Id. at 538.
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and applied in Salerno is more than a mere modification or narrow-
ing of the original test. As restated, the test fails to consider the
effect of the sanction upon the prisoner; rather, any sanction "rea-
sonably related" to a legitimate government objective will be af-
firmed. 152 Justice Marshall recognized the danger of this in his
Wolfish dissent, 153 and demonstrated its unacceptability in his dusk-
to-dawn curfew hypothetical in Salerno.154 A majority of the Salerno
Court agreed, however, that there should be no check on the legisla-
ture's power to "regulate" pretrial release beyond the de minimus ra-
tional relation requirement discussed in Wolfish.' 55 Applying this
analysis, the Salerno Court did not inquire into the nature of deten-
tion and its harsh effect on the detainee.
Had the Court applied the Mendoza-Martinez criteria in Salerno, it
would have concluded that pretrial detention on the grounds of
dangerousness is punishment. The effects of pretrial detention on
the accused are devastating. The untried defendant is deprived of
liberty, the right to free association, the right to travel, 156 and the
right to privacy.' 57 He will probably lose his job, 158 and his family
will be disrupted. 59 He will probably be jailed under conditions of
confinement as bad or worse than those under which convicted
152 Id. at 539 ("Thus, if a particular condition or restriction ... is reasonably related
to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to
'punishment.' 
").
153 Id. at 565 (Marshall. J., dissenting) ("By this process of elimination [of several
Mendoza-Martinez factors], the Court contracts a broad standard, sensitive to the depriva-
tions imposed on detainees, into one that seeks merely to sanitize official motives and
prohibit irrational behavior. As thus reformulated, the test lacks any real content.").
154 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2108 (Marshall, J., dissenting); seesupra notes 93-99 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Justice Marshall's hypothetical).
155 The danger of allowing the government to justify preventive detention simply be-
cause it advances a legitimate government interest was recognized long ago. As Justice
Jackson wrote:
The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any author-
ity that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition
imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new
purposes .... [I]f we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doc-
trine of the Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it
creates will be in its own image.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944)(Jackson,J., dissenting).
156 United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1368 (D.C. 1981)(Mack,J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
157 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)(upholding conditions of detention whereby
detainees were confined two to a cell, prohibited from receiving books and packages,
forced to remain outside their cells during routine "shake-down" searches, and sub-
jected to body-cavity searches).
158 Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 289, 353
(197 1)[hereinafter Harvard Study].
159 Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1368 (Mack, J., dissenting).
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felons are imprisoned. 160 Pretrial detention may affect the defend-
ant's appearance and demeanor and will hamper him in preparing a
defense.161 Consequently, both conviction and a severe sentence
are more likely for the pretrial detainee. 162 Even if he is acquitted,
pretrial detention stigmatizes the individual and may make it diffi-
cult to reestablish employment and personal relationships after re-
lease. 163 Compared to the effect of other punitive sanctions such as
fines and probation, the effect of pretrial detention is far more
punitive.
Because the Court ignored the effect of pretrial detention on
the defendant and concentrated its analysis on the connection be-
tween preventive detention and crime prevention, much of the Sa-
lerno decision is premised on the trial judge's ability to predict future
criminal behavior. If trial judges are unable to predict dangerous
behavior, pretrial detention may not be rationally related to the goal
of reducing pretrial crime because many persons who are, in fact,
likely to commit crimes will not be detained. Likewise, the sanction
might be excessive in relation to that goal because many accused
persons who are not dangerous will be detained.164 Moreover, the
scheme might be ineffective for reasons not necessarily related to
the predictive success of judges. These factors would then make it
more likely that pretrial detention is punitive. 165 Despite the impor-
tance of these factors in distinguishing punitive from regulatory
160 Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to
Due Process, 85 MIcH. L. REV. 510, 517 (1986).
161 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972); Harvard Study, supra note 158, at 347-
51.
162 Harvard Study, supra note 158, at 347-51.
163 Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1978); von Hirsch, Prediction
of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 717,
743 (1972); Harvard Study, supra note 158, at 351-54; cf. Wisconsin v. Costantineau, 400
U.S. 433, 437 (1970)(considering stigma associated with state action against defendant
as a factor in striking down temperance statute).
164 Persons who are predicted to be dangerous but who in fact would not commit a
crime if released are called "false positives" in the research literature. "True positives"
are those persons who are correctly predicted to be dangerous. Similarly, "false nega-
tives" are persons who are predicted to be nondangerous but who in fact will commit a
crime if released, while "true negatives" are correctly predicted to be nondangerous. In
considering the constitutionality of pretrial detention, focusing on the incidence of false
positive predictions is appropriate because only positive predictions result in detention,
thereby incurring a risk of erroneously depriving a person of the constitutional right to
liberty with no gain in crime prevention. Alschuler, supra note 160, at 540.
165 Both the Mendoza-Martinez test and the diluted Wolfish test of whether a scheme is
regulatory require that the sanction be rationally related to achievement of its goal.
Likewise, both tests require that the sanction not be excessive in achieving that goal. See




sanctions, the Salerno Court dismissed any concerns of erroneous
prediction by simply asserting that "there is nothing inherently un-
attainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct."1 66
The great weight of sociological data belies the Court's confi-
dence in the ability of trial judges to predict future criminal behav-
ior. 167 One scholar, for example, recently surveyed the empirical
research literature regarding predictions of dangerousness.1 68 He
concluded that "statistical predictions of criminal behavior in gen-
eral, and violent criminal behavior in particular, are much more
likely to be wrong than right."' 69 Similarly, after years of study, an-
other scholar concluded that the clinical and criminological research
as a whole is "reasonably accurate" and supports the conclusion
that only one in three predictions of violent criminal behavior is cor-
rect.1 70 Even commentators who support some form of pretrial de-
tention agree that the risk of erroneous detention under the Bail
Reform Act is uncomfortably high. 17 1 The general consensus is that
166 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2103 (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984)).
167 See, e.g., Ewing, Schall v. Martin: Preventive Detention and Dangerousness Through the
Looking Glass, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 173 (1985)(surveying research literature on predicting
violent and criminal behavior and concluding that predictions of violence are more often
wrong than right); Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Developments in Psychology
and the Law, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 147, 159 (1983)(concluding that current pre-
diction studies are reasonably accurate and that most crimes committed by persons on
release are committed by a small proportion of those persons); J. MONAHAN, PREDICTING
VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL TECHNIQUES 77 (198 1) (no more than
one in three clinical predictions of violent behavior are accurate); American Psychologi-
cal Association, Report of the Task Force on the Role of Psychology in the CriminalJustice System,
1978 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1110 (1978)("[T]he validity of psychological predictions of
dangerous behavior.., is extremely poor, so poor that one could oppose their use on
the strictly empirical grounds that psychologists are not professionally competent to
make such judgments."); Harvard Study, supra note 158, at 315 (concluding that in order
to prevent half the crimes committed by persons on release in sample group, ratio of
nondangerous to dangerous detainees would be nearly five-to-one).
168 Ewing, supra note 167.
169 Id. at 196. Ewing also concluded that "no more than one out of three clinical
predictions of dangerousness proves to be accurate." Id. at 185-86.
170 Professor Monahan concluded that:
[T]he one-third of the individuals who are predicted as violent and are arrested for
a violent crime are in fact the same people who commit most of the unreported and
unsolved violent acts. It is not that the false positives are really true positives in disguise but
rather that the true positives are "truer" (i.e., more violent) than we imagined.
Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Developments in Psychology and Law, in PSYCHOL-
OGY AND THE LAw 147, 159 (1983)(emphasis added).
171 Alschuler, supra note 160, at 537-48 (arguing that the prediction of future danger-
ousness is likely to be more accurate than the studies suggest because of methodological
and interpretive errors in the studies and because persons covered by the Bail Reform
Act are a high-risk group. Alschuler conceded, however, that "firm predictions of future
violence probably cannot be made in large numbers of cases. Any policy of preventive
detention likely to reduce the amount of crime substantially would be likely to require
the detention of many people who would not commit crimes if released." Id. at 546-47);
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not even trained professionals can predict dangerous behavior well
enough to assure that most of the persons detained are in fact dan-
gerous. 172 Untrained in psychology, judges will almost certainly do
no better than professional psychologists.17 3
Moreover, pretrial detention may be an ineffective response to
pretrial crime. 174 First, the use of pretrial detention for some ar-
restees will probably result in longer delays in bringing other ar-
restees to trial. 175 As these delays lengthen, arrestees who have
been released prior to trial will be more likely to commit crimes
while out on bail. 176 Second, there is evidence that pretrial deten-
tion may increase recidivist tendencies in detainees. 177 This result
would be particularly ironic in the case of the pretrial detainee who
is eventually acquitted of the alleged crime which triggered his de-
tention, but who is now "hardened, embittered, and more likely to
recidivate once released."' 78 The empirical questions of whether
pretrial detention will increase the level of pretrial crime and
whether acquitted detainees will become hardened criminals await
an answer, but the uncertainty itself lends strength to the argument
that pretrial detention is not a rational response to the problem of
crimes committed by persons on pretrial release. 179 If pretrial de-
Comment, Preventive Detention: A Constitutional But Ineffective Means of Fighting Pretrial
Crime, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439, 471 (1986)("Even with the most favorable
procedural due process protections, the false positive rate never falls below fifty per-
cent.")(citations omitted)[hereinafter Comment, Fighting Pretrial Crime].
172 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 256, 293 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Monahan, supra note
170 at 152.
173 There are, of course, cases in which almost anyone could predict violent behavior.
For example, an articulated threat to commit murder made by an experienced criminal
should not be ignored. Alschuler, supra note 160, at 544-45. Such a case, however, is no
justification for detention of the usual defendant.
174 Comment, Fighting Pretrial Crime, supra note 171, at 471-72.
175 Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1121, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1984)(views of Represen-
tative Kastenmeier, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration ofJustice)).
176 Id. at 472 (citing Bail Reform Act 1981-82: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st &
2d Sess. 204-05 (1983)(testimony of Ira Glasser, American Civil Liberties Union)).
177 Id. (citing Harvard Study, supra note 158, at 351-53).
178 Harvard Study, supra note 158, at 352.
179 In fact, more promising means of reducing the incidence of pretrial crime have
been identified. See, e.g., Comment, Fighting Pretrial Crime, supra note 171, at 473-75 (con-
cluding that increased pretrial supervision of accused persons, speedier trials, more re-
strictive conditions of release, and bail revocation for crimes committed during pretrial
release would be more effective means of fighting pretrial crime than the Bail Reform
Act); Harvard Study, supra note 158, at 359-68 (concluding that expedited trials, restric-
tive conditions of release, forfeiture of right to bail for pretrial crime, and stricter




tention is not rationally related to the purpose assigned to it, the
inference that the sanction is punitive grows.180
Furthermore, the incentive imparted to judges faced with a mo-
tion for pretrial detention may be to err on the side of detention and
thereby make fewer verifiable errors.181 If a judge rejects the mo-
tion and the defendant commits a crime, the judge will appear to
have erred. Conversely, there will be no way to check the reliability
of a prediction of dangerousness because an incarcerated person
cannot prove the prediction wrong.18 2 As one scholar explained:
[T]he [preventive detention] system will appear to be malfunctioning
only when it releases persons who prove to be worse risks than antici-
pated. The pretrial misconduct of these persons will seem to validate,
and will indeed augment, the fear and insecurity that the system is cal-
culated to appease. But when the system detains persons who could
safely have been released, its errors will be invisible. Since no de-
tained defendant will commit a public offense, each decision to detain
fulfills the prophecy that is thought to warrant it, while any decision to
release may be refuted by the results.
The inevitable consequence is a continuing pressure to broaden
the system in order to reach ever more potential detainees. Indeed,
this pressure will be generated by the same fears that made preventive
detention seem attractive in the first place.' 83
The evidence that pretrial detention will be both excessive and
ineffective in combatting crime by persons on release supports the
conclusion that pretrial detention on the grounds of future danger-
ousness is an impermissible punishment without trial. Some per-
sons who are dangerous will probably not be identified, and thereby
will be free to commit more crimes while on release. Many persons
who are not dangerous will be misidentified, and thereby will
be subjected to the hardship and indignity normally reserved for
convicted criminals after trial.18 4 Significantly, some people held
without bail did not commit the crime which triggered their
detention. 85  They will have been punished despite their
180 Under both the Wofish and Mendoza-Martinez analyses, this flaw in the Bail Reform
Act's pretrial detention scheme weighs in favor of a finding of punitive effect.
181 Tribe, supra note 67, at 382.
182 S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1983).
183 Tribe, supra note 67, at 375. This pressure to expand the reach of the pretrial
detention scheme is probably even more acute on Congress. As one commentator ob-
served, pretrial detention "represented a 'no lose' situation for the legislators who sup-
ported it: constituents are satisfied that their representatives are tough on crime and
citizens whose liberties are most affected by the [Bail Reform] Act are not in a position
to command congressional attention." Note, The Loss of Innocence, supra note 127, at 814.
184 See supra notes 167-73 (assessing risk of misidentification).
185 Twenty-two percent of the persons detained under the Bail Reform Act did not
commit the underlying offense. Bail Reform Act 1981-82: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th
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innocence.186
In light of the high risk of erroneously depriving nondangerous
and even innocent persons of their liberty, the grave punitive effect
of pretrial detention makes that sanction unacceptable under the
due process clause. Liberty is a fundamental right.18 7 Had the
Court exercised the heightened scrutiny necessary to validate a
scheme depriving a citizen of liberty,188 the Court would not have
approved the Bail Reform Act.
B. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT UNDERMINED
The Court's eighth amendment analysis in Salerno insufficiently
weighed the traditional role of bail in American criminal law'8 9 and
contradicted the common sense import of the excessive bail clause.
Although the Constitution neither expressly grants an absolute right
to bail in all cases nor expressly prohibits the consideration of dan-
gerousness in bail decisions, 190 there are good reasons to believe
that preventive detention as authorized by the Bail Reform Act vio-
lates the eighth amendment.
First, there are strong intuitive arguments that the excessive
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 86 (1983)(testimony of Guy Willets, Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts).
186 The likelihood that some persons detained under a system of pretrial detention
are neither dangerous nor guilty did not chill the Salerno majority, which balanced the
interests of the individual against the interests of the state and came down on the side of
"law and order." The same problem, however, has disturbed many commentators. See,
e.g., von Hirsch, supra note 163, at 740. Professor von Hirsch observed that:
Proponents of preventive confinement must argue in terms of "balancing" the indi-
vidual's interest in not being mistakenly confined against society's need for protec-
tion from the actually dangerous person .... Mhat cost-benefit thinking is wholly
inappropriate here. If a system of preventive incarceration is known systematically to
generate mistaken confinements, then it is unacceptable in absolute terms because
it violates the obligation of society to do individualjustice. Such a system cannot be
justified by arguing that its aggregate social benefits exceed the aggregate amount
of injustice done to mistakenly confined individuals.
(emphasis in original).
187 "No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. V; United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1369
(D.C. 1981)(Mack, J., dissenting)("One cannot question that the right to liberty is a fun-
damental right."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
188 When the government seeks to limit a fundamental right, it must prove that the
means chosen is necessary for, and not merely related to, the effectuation of a compel-
ling state interest. United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1369 (Mack, J., dissent-
ing)(citations omitted).
189 The federal jurisdiction protected a defendant's right to bail in noncapital cases
until the passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The right was clearly established by
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, if not by the Constitution. Alschuler, supra note 160,
at 512.
190 The eighth amendment simply provides, in part, that, "Excessive bail shall not be
required. .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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bail clause grants a constitutional right to bail in noncapital cases.
Until very recently, the eighth amendment was widely read as grant-
ing such a right.'91 Although the English right to bail was more
circumscribed, 192 arguments that the American right to bail is simi-
larly circumscribed are not persuasive because Congress is more
limited in its control over individual rights than is the English Parlia-
ment.193 Moreover, the excessive bail clause is meaningless unless
it is read to prohibit judicial and legislative intrusions on the tradi-
tional right to bail. 194 Without a constitutional guarantee of bail in
all but the traditional exceptions, the government will be able to
circumvent the clause merely by defining certain offenses as non-
bailable.' 95 The framers of the Bill of Rights would not have ap-
proved such an insidious usurpation of individual liberty.' 96
Second, the Act authorizes extended pretrial detention trig-
gered by no more than a finding of probable cause to believe that
'9' Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657, 659 (7th
Cir. 1926)(Butler, Circuit Justice); H.R. REP. No. 1541, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 6 (1966);
Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail (Pt. II), 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1125, 1180
(1965); but see Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. REV. 33 (1977).
192 In the English theory of civil liberties, Parliament itself was the ultimate source of
individual rights. As English law developed, only persons accused of offenses which
Parliament had determined to be bailable were granted a right to bail. Foote, The Coming
Constitutional Crisis in Bail (Pt. 1), 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 968-69 (1965).
193 "The Eighth Amendment is in the American Bill of Rights of 1789, not the English
Bill of Rights of 1689 .... [O]ur Bill of Rights was written and adopted to guarantee
Americans greater freedom than had been enjoyed by their ancestors who had been
driven from Europe by persecution." Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 557
(1952)(Black,J., dissenting)(citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1941)).
In dissent, Judge Mack recently highlighted the differences between the American and
English theories of government. He wrote:
[T]he majority, with its emphasis on Parliament, does not make allowances for the
differences between the English system of absolute Parliamentary control over indi-
vidual rights and the basic American system of a government of limited and defined
powers delegated by the people and circumscribed by individual liberties .... [I]t
seems somehow ludicrous to me to suggest that the Eighth Amendment was drafted
with the idea of isolating Congress from its restraints.
United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1367 (D.C. 1981)(Mack,J., dissenting)(citing
Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960)), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
194 The exceptional cases cited by the Salerno majority do not support the Court's
decision to balance the interests of society against the interests of the individual in every
case in which the legislature prescribes detention. Rather, those cases can be read as
narrow categories of situations in which detention without bail has been tolerated, i.e.,
when the defendant is incompetent or otherwise unable to act responsibly, when the
government exercises extraordinary powers to protect the national security, and when
detention is necessary to protect the trial process.
195 Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2108-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
196 United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1365 (Mack, J., dissenting)("Surely the
framers of our Bill of Rights did not intend to fashion illusory protection-leaving open
the possibility that a subsequent act of a legislature could empty a critical provision of the
federal Constitution of all content.") (emphasis in original).
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the defendant committed a crime.19 7 Indeed, even the absence of
probable cause might not be fatal to a detention motion because the
weight of the evidence is only one factor in determining the defend-
ant's dangerousness.198 Although this minimal suspicion of guilt
may distinguish the Bail Reform Act from a pure preventive deten-
tion scheme, probable cause is an unacceptably low standard of
proof by which to deny a presumptively innocent person the right to
bail. 199 Professor Alschuler has pointed out that even though bail
may have been denied to dangerous arrestees at common law, that
denial was predicated on substantial preliminary proof of the de-
fendant's guilt.200 In Professor Alschuler's view, an absolute prohi-
bition of pretrial detention for dangerousness would contradict
centuries of Anglo-American jurisprudence. 20 1 Similarly, however,
the Anglo-American tradition allows detention for dangerousness
only when there is a demonstrated high probability that the defend-
ant will be convicted of the predicate offense.20 2 Thus, preventive
detention of defendants on less than substantial proof of guilt of the
predicate offense violates the traditional interpretation of the role of
bail in Anglo-American law.203 Assuming arguendo that there is no
constitutional right to bail, the Bail Reform Act is nevertheless un-
constitutional because it is triggered by no more than a finding of
probable cause.
C. THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IGNORED
The Salerno majority's refusal to recognize the presumption of
innocence as a fundamental tenet coloring the whole of the criminal
197 Under the Act, the judicial officer presiding at the detention hearing is charged
only to determine whether there is "clear and convincing evidence" of the facts used to
support the government's allegation of dangerousness. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1985).
Although the judicial officer is to consider the weight of the evidence in determining
whether safe conditions of release exist, substantial proof of the defendant's guilt of the
underlying offense is not required. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1985).
198 Alschuler, supra note 160, at 518.
199 Id. at 533-34.
200 Id. at 551-58. Cf. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 23-1322(b)(2)(C) (1987), which provides that
"No person.., shall be ordered detained unless the judicial officer finds that ... there is
a substantial probability that the person committed the offense for which he is present
before the judicial officer." The "substantial probability" standard is higher than prob-
able cause and has been interpreted to be equal to "the standard required 'to secure a
civil injunction-likelihood of success on the merits.'" United States v. Edwards, 430
A.2d at 1339 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1970)).




justice system is unacceptable. 20 4 This refusal traces back to Bell v.
Wolfish, 20 5 in which the plaintiffs sought to enjoin certain rules and
practices followed at the federal facility where they were being de-
tained prior to trial.20 6 The gist of the plaintiffs' argument was that
pretrial detainees could not be subjected to conditions of confine-
ment identical to those under which convicted criminals were im-
prisoned.20 7 The plaintiffs relied partly on the proposition that
because of the presumption of innocence, detainees must be treated
as innocent persons. 208 The Court rejected that proposition, flatly
stating that the presumption of innocence "allocates the burden of
proof in criminal trials .... But it has no application to a determi-
nation of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before
his trial." 209 Maintaining this position,, the Salerno majority did not
address the presumption of innocence in passing on the constitu-
tionality of pretrial detention.
Although the presumption of innocence is undoubtedly re-
flected in the burden of proof rules in criminal trials, allowing the
government to avoid the presumption during the period preceding
trial unfairly deprives the defendant of a critical constitutional pro-
tection. 210 Recognizing this, Justice Stevens articulated a more rea-
sonable interpretation of the presumption of innocence in his
Wolfish dissent.211 Justice Stevens wrote that the presumption
"shield[s] a person awaiting trial from potentially oppressive gov-
ernmental actions" 2 12 by presuming "both that he is innocent of
prior criminal conduct and that he has no present intention to com-
mit any offense."213 Because this view of the presumption protects
a defendant even before trial, it is the view shared by the dissenting
Justices in Salerno.
The trivialized version of the presumption of innocence
adopted by the Salerno majority is contrary to the traditional inter-
pretation of the presumption. In 1895, the Court, in Coffin v. United
204 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2109 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[The very pith and purpose
of this statute is an abhorrent limitation of the presumption of innocence.").
205 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
206 Id. at 523.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 532.
209 Id. at 534.
210 The presumption of innocence is "constitutionally rooted." Cool v. United States,
409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972).
211 441 U.S. 520, 580 (1979)(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Brennanjoined this dis-
sent. Id. Justice Marshall dissented in a separate opinion. Id. at 563 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
212 Id. at 583 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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States, observed that the presumption was "the undoubted law, axio-
matic and elementary... [lying] at the foundation of the administra-
tion of bur criminal law," 214 and apparently not confined to the
courtroom. Similarly, in 1951, the Court recognized that the denial
of reasonable bail implicated the presumption. 215 The Court
warned that "[u]nless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the
presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle,
would lose its meaning. '2 16 In 1973, the defendant was still clothed
with the presumption of innocence during pretrial detention.217 In
1978, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia was of the opinion that to consider the presumption irrelevant to
pretrial detention was "profoundly to misconstrue it."218 The same
year, the Supreme Court repeated the sweeping language of Cof-
fin.2 19 In 1979, however, the Court solemnly announced that the
presumption of innocence "allocates the burden of proof in criminal
trials .... But it has no application to a determination of the rights
of a pretrial detainee ....*"220 Justice Stevens, in dissent, was as-
tounded: "I cannot believe the Court means what it seems to be
saying." 221 Thus, the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize the pre-
sumption of innocence as more than a procedural tool ignores a
long line of broader interpretations. The Salerno majority should
have considered the presumption of innocence in its analysis of the
Bail Reform Act. Had it done so, the Court would have concluded
that the presumption of innocence is a substantive, constitutional
limitation on the power of the legislature to regulate pretrial re-
lease. 222 Because preventive detention conflicts with this constitu-
tional limitation, the Bail Reform Act should have been struck
down.
As the states begin to follow the lead of the federal government
in expanding preventive detention, many more persons will be de-
prived of their liberty for significant lengths of time under the guise
of dangerousness. 223 For those persons, the obvious retreat is to
challenge the Bail Reform Act "as applied." The remainder of this
Note analyzes an "as applied" question which was not before the
214 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
215 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
216 Id.
217 McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 273 (1973).
218 Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
219 Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 (1978).
220 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979).
221 Id. at 583 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2109 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
223 See infra notes 229-42 (noting length of detentions under the Bail Reform Act).
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Court in Salerno: given the facial constitutionality of pretrial deten-
tion, when will extended detention become punitive and therefore
unconstitutional?
D. TOO MUCH OF A GOOD THING?
Many federal courts have conceded that extended pretrial de-
tention without bail might "degenerate into punishment" and
thereby become unconstitutional. 224 The Salerno Court did not ad-
dress the question of when extended pretrial detention becomes pu-
nitive, acknowledging only that it might become so. 225 Congress,
too, was concerned with the length of detention that might befall an
untried defendant under the Bail Reform Act.226 The legislative his-
tory of the Act reveals that Congress relied heavily on the provisions
of the Speedy Trial Act 227 to ensure that no defendant would be
held for an unacceptable length of time without possibility of bail.228
Therefore, both Congress and the lower courts have acknowledged
that the hardships suffered by the pretrial detainee increase with the
duration of the detention.
Neither the widespread disapproval of excessive pretrial deten-
tion nor the Speedy Trial Act has prevented very lengthy detention
in some cases. One recent study of the Speedy Trial Act concluded
that "processing time" in ten percent of all federal criminal cases
exceeds 360 days.229 The Supreme Court has approved delays of up
to two full years between arraignment of the last codefendant and
trial. 230 In cases under the Bail Reform Act, 307 defendants were
detained without bail 151 days or longer before their dismissal, plea
224 United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1007 (2d Cir. 1986)(Feinberg,
CJ., concurring); United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544, 547 (1st Cir. 1986); United
States v. Acceturo, 783 F.2d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d
1510, 1516 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 768 (7th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1985).
225 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101 n.4.
226 United States v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1985)(citing S. REP. No. 225,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 n.63 (1983)).
227 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b) (1985). The Speedy Trial Act provides that the trial of any
person who is being held in detention solely because he is awaiting trial "shall com-
mence not later than ninety days following the beginning of such continuous detention
.... " The ninety-day limit is subject to certain periods of excludable delay enumerated
in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1985).
228 United States v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1985).
229 Bridges, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Effects on Delays in Federal Criminal Litigation, 73
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 50, 69 (1982). "Processing time" is the time between the
defendant's first official court notice and final disposition, including time through sen-
tencing. Id. at 68 n.62.
230 Henderson v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1871 (1986).
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of guilty, or trial during the year ending June 30, 1985.231 The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit approved pre-
trial detention without bail for over sixteen months in United States v.
Zannino.23 2 Clearly, detention of untried defendants for these pro-
longed periods far exceeds the expectation or intention of Congress
that detention under the Bail Reform Act would last for ninety days
in a "worst case" scenario. 233
In addressing the problem of long pretrial detention, the lower
courts have essentially been performing a case-by-case analysis. 234
Factors considered in the analysis have included the length of deten-
tion already suffered, the complexity and seriousness of the case,
whether one side has needlessly added to the complexity or length
of the case without good cause, and the strength of the evidence of
the defendent's guilt or dangerousness. 235 As a result of this case-
by-case analysis, courts have determined that pretrial detention be-
came punitive after five months, 236 six months, 23 7 eight months,238
and fourteen months.239 On the other hand, detentions of three
and one-half months,240 seven months, 241 and sixteen months242
have been approved.
The case-by-case method has resulted in gross inconsistencies
among the federal circuit courts.243 Although the requirements of
due process are flexible and vary with the situation, 244 it is funda-
mentally unfair for accused persons in one circuit to be "regulated"
longer than similarly accused persons in other circuits. This is par-
ticularly true when the determination of when the detention be-
comes punitive turns on subjective evaluations of the "seriousness"
231 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
Table D-13 of Appendix 1, Detailed Statistical Tables (1985).
232 798 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986).
233 130 CONG. REC. S941 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984)(remarks of Senator Thurmond).
234 United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Acceturo,
783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510 (10th Cir. 1986).
See also Comment, Fighting Pretrial Crime, supra note 171, at 464-71 (arguing in favor of
case-by-case determination of when regulatory detention becomes punitive).
235 United States v. Acceturo, 783 F.2d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 1986).
236 United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1986).
237 United States v. LoFranco, 620 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D.N.Y. 1985).
238 United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986).
239 United States v. Gonzales-Claudio, 806 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1986).
240 United States v. Acceturo, 783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1986).
241 United States v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1985).
242 United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986).
243 See supra notes 236-42 and accompanying text (illustrating gross inconsistencies
between circuits).
244 Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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of the case or the "strength" of the evidence. 245 It is likely that the
determinations made under such an analysis will vary not only
among circuits, but also among trial judges within the same circuit.
Furthermore, the case-by-case analysis necessarily requires a
considerable amount of judicial attention. Because there is consid-
erable incentive for the detained person to make motions for release
regularly during the period of detention, and because pretrial de-
tention is being used quite frequently, 246 motions for release will
become very common.247 As judges spend more time examining
these motions, they will have less time to conduct trials.248 The
case-by-case analysis, therefore, may compound the problem of
crimes committed by persons on pretrial release by lengthening the
delay between arrest and trial for defendants who were not
detained.249
Finally, most of the factors relied on in the case-by-case analysis
bear little relation to whether the effect of detention on the defend-
ant has become punitive. Although the length of detention already
served is certainly relevant, neither the seriousness and complexity
of the case nor the strength of the evidence of guilt or dangerous-
ness is relevant in determining the effect of pretrial detention on the
accused. Similarly, the reasons why the case is so long or complex
are irrelevant to this determination. 250 As these factors enter into
the decision to allow extended pretrial incarceration, the suspicion
grows that harsher treatment exists for defendants whose alleged
conduct the judge considers more culpable than others. The de-
fendant would be singled out on the basis of the kind of person the
judge suspects he is, rather than for any proven criminal act. In-
245 See supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing factors relied upon in case-
by-case analysis).
246 See Alschuler, supra note 160, at 515 (considering reports that judges may be hold-
ing detention hearings in as many as 25% of all federal felony cases).
247 Id. at 517 n.30:
[T]he effective representation of a detained defendant apparently would require his
lawyer to appear before a judge at periodic intervals to ask, "Now?" After an un-
specified number of months during which the judge would reply, "Not yet," he
would answer, "Yes, now."... [Tihe moment of magic metamorphosis would vary
from one case to the next.
248 See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (trial postponement contributes to
incidence of crimes by persons on release).
249 Id.
250 It should be noted that the threat of a judgment that he was "needlessly adding to
the length or complexity of the case" might chill the defendant in making a defense.
Considering this factor to the detriment of the defendant seems close to punishing him
for what might be construed as "annoying" the judge. Cf. United States v. Mendoza,
663 F. Supp. 1043 (D.N.J. 1987)(noting "chilling effect" of excluding delays caused by
defendant's pretrial motions in determining compliance with Speedy Trial Act).
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deed, a legitimate case-by-case analysis of the punitive effect of de-
tention necessarily requires consideration of the personal
characteristics and circumstances of each detainee. For example, it
is easy to imagine a situation in which the effect of detention on A
would be more harsh than the effect of detention on B, even though
B had been detained much longer than A. Assuming A and B were
accused of similar offenses, would it then be fair to release A on bail
before B? The difficulties presented by a case-by-case determina-
tion of when pretrial detention becomes punitive warrant the adop-
tion of a bright-line time limit.251 Adopting a bright-line rule in all
federal courts would improve the current case-by-case analysis in
several ways. 252
First, an outer limit on the length of pretrial detention for dan-
gerousness would mitigate the harsh effect of detention on the ac-
cused. 253 Moreover, a bright-line rule is more fair than a case-by-
case approach. A bright-line rule will subject all defendants to the
same maximum pretrial detention. The subjective moral judgments
which contribute to inconsistencies under the case-by-case analysis
will no longer be a factor.254
Second, imposing a firm time limit will force the government to
seek the drastic measure of detention without bail only when it has
substantially prepared its case for trial before indictment. 255 This
might curtail the use of detention without bail to some extent be-
cause the prosecution would move for detention less often. The re-
sult of this curtailment, however, will achieve what Congress
intended-that pretrial detention without bail be reserved for a
"small but identifiable group" of particularly dangerous
251 The need for a bright-line limit was suggested in United States v. Acceturo, 783
F.2d 382, 392 (3d Cir. 1986)(SloviterJ., dissenting). Judge Sloviter argued for a bright-
line limit which could be extended only after a full adversarial hearing with more strin-
gent procedural requirements than are required to impose the initial detention. If trial
had not begun when the initial period of detention lapsed, the defendant would ordina-
rily be released on bail but the charges would not be dropped. Id. In the absence of
legislative action, such a rule could be prescribed by the judiciary exercising its supervi-
sory power over criminal procedure and evidence. Id.
252 Contra Comment, Fighting Pretrial Crime, supra note 171, at 464-71 (arguing in favor
of case-by-case analysis of when pretrial detention becomes punitive).
253 See supra notes 156-63 and accompanying text (illustrating harsh effect of deten-
tion on accused).
254 See supra notes 234-42 and accompanying text (considering factors which lead to
inconsistencies). To the extent that some defendants who are detained prior to trial may
not be held for the full time limit, some disparity in treatment will remain. Limiting the
maximum detention, however, will assure that no defendant will be subjected to a
grossly disproportionate amount of detention.
255 Cf. Comment, Fighting Pretrial Crime, supra note 171, at 470 (arguing that case-by-




Third, a firm limit on the length of detention satisfies Con-
gress's intention that no defendant be detained for an unreasonably
long period of time. In persuading their colleagues to adopt the
pretrial detention statute, several senators testified that ninety days
was the longest detention the statute authorized. 257 Although Con-
gress chose not to place an ultimate cap on the length of detention
under the Act, a ninety-day limit is more reasonable than the very
lengthy terms that have resulted from reliance on the Speedy Trial
Act.
2 5 8
Finally, a time limit would require less judicial supervision than
the case-by-case analysis. 259 The rule would be self-executing. As a
result, fewer trials involving non-detained defendants will be
delayed while the trial judge entertains the regular motions of those
defendants whose temporary detention is stretching into punish-
ment.260 A self-executing rule would enable the judge to spend
more time on trials, thereby reducing the incidence of crimes com-
mitted by persons on pretrial release.261
V. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Salerno,262 the Supreme Court approved a pre-
trial detention scheme which allows the government to imprison
presumptively innocent persons for long periods of time without
benefit of trial for the alleged offenses which trigger their detention.
Moreover, the Bail Reform Act, as interpreted, does not adequately
recognize that detention is more onerous the longer it is sustained.
In order to assure that untried defendants are not detained for long
periods of time "while the processes ofjustice grind to a halt,"2 63 a
bright-line rule should be adopted to limit the harsh effects of de-
256 S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1983).
257 Senator Grassley stated that "[n]o evidence has been presented.., that the 90 day
Speedy Trial Act limit has not worked perfectly well to protect against lengthy incarcera-
tion." 130 CONG. REC. S945 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984). Senator Thurmond and Senator
Laxalt foresaw the ninety-day limit of the Speedy Trial Act as the "worst case limit" and
"upper bound" of detention, respectively. Id. at S941 (Sen. Thurmond); id. at S943
(Sen. Laxalt).
258 See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text (noting lengthy pretrial detentions).
259 See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text (noting extensive judicial supervi-
sion required by case-by-case analysis).
260 See supra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing incentive for detainees to
make frequent motions for release under case-by-case analysis).
261 See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text (lengthy delays contribute to pre-
trial crime).
262 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
263 130 CONG. REc. S945 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984)(statement of Sen. Grassley).
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tention on the accused. Only a bright-line rule will ensure that all
accused persons are treated fairly and equally by the criminal justice
system.
MICHAEL J. EASON
